Jul 182016
 

Study Guide Bava Kamma 48

Rav’s opinion is that if one puts fruits in another’s property without permission, one is not responsible if an animal eats it and gets sick/dies from it.  His opinion is questioned by various tanaitic sources that seem to indicate otherwise.  Each one is answered up to fit in with Rav.  If one brings in an animal or item with permission and the owner therefore accepts responsibility, is he also responsible in a case where the item/animal gets damaged by someone else’s animal that was trespassing?  Rava brings 2 other laws about related cases where the animal case turns into a bor (pit) case.  And one more case where a person comes into one’s property without permission.  If the owner attacks him, is he responsible for damages or not?  The next case in the mishna is analyzed – when the animal falls into a pit in the owner’s property and contaminated the water or kills a person inside the pit.  Exactly in what scenario is the water case – when he contaminates on the way down or after having fallen there?  In the case of killing, he pays ransom – is it because it is a shur muad?  Or maybe a shor tam according to the opinion that you pay half the ransom or according to the opinion that goring in the owner’s property pays full damages and would thereby pay full ransom upon death.

Jul 172016
 

A pregnant cow damages but it is unclear if the calf was born before or after it damaged, the mishna says that half is paid from the cow and half from the calf. This doesn’t make sense as the owner of the damaged animal will get 3/4 instead of half damages!  Abaye and Rava each interpret the meaning of the mishna in different ways.   If someone places items in someone else’s property with or without permission and it damages or gets damaged – what is the law?  If he gets permission to leave it their, the rabbis understand that the owner of the property accepted responsibility to watch the item.  Rebbi disagrees and says unless he explicitly said he would watch it, he has not accepted responsibility of a shomer.  If fruits are left without permission and the animal gets damaged from eating them, Rav thinks the owner who left the fruits is not responsible (he is only responsible if the animal tripped) because the fruit owner can say, “What were you doing eating my fruits?”  Rav’s opinion is questioned by Rav Sheshet based on a braita.

Jul 152016
 

Once the animal is sentenced to death, it is forbidden to benefit from it.  Therefore at that point, if one sells it, the sale is invalid and likewise if one dedicates it to the temple, it is not holy and if one slaughters it, the meat is forbidden.  However before the sentence, all those acts are valid.  There is a debate regarding someone watching someone else’s animal and the animal gets sentenced to death – can the one watching it, return it to the owner after the sentence or not?  The gemara rejects the option that they are arguing about whether one who steals something that then becomes forbidden can he return the object if does he need to pay the value of it at the time of the sale.  The gemara concludes that their argument has to do with whether or not the animal has to appear in court – if he does, then the original owner can blame the watcher for bringing it to court and claim that had he returned it before court, he would have sent the animal away and he never would have been sentenced to death.  When it comes to the 4 shomrim who have someone’s animal – what is their level of responsibility?  A braita is brought and then it is determined according to whose opinion is this braita.  There is a 4-way argument regarding what level of watching is enough to exempt the owner from damages of a shor tam and a shor muad.  Is the halacha the same for both or different?

Jul 142016
 

Why was it necessary for the verses in the Torah to specify that an animal is killed even if it killed a minor?  Is this the case also if it was a shor tam? If an animal kills without intent to kill or with intent to kill an animal and killed a person and other such cases, the animal is not killed but Rav and Shmuel have a debate about whether or not the ransom needs to be paid.  The gemara brings in the opinion of Rabbi Shimon who holds that even if a person tried to kill someone but killed someone else instead, he is not punished by death.  He would hold the same to be true for the animal who kills.  And this would disagree with the tanna of our mishna.  The derivation for the two opinions are brought.

Jul 132016
 

A husband inherits his wife’s property that was owned by her but not money that will be coming to her after her death.  Therefore the ransom payment goes to her inheritors and not her husband.  There is a discussion about money that is owed to the woman – is that considered in her hands or not?  Does it depend on if it is money or property?  There is a 3 way argument about whether in a case where the animal killed without intent is there ransom payment and if one killed a slave, is there the payment of the fine of 30 shekalim?  Is it integrally connected to the animal being stoned (if he is not stoned, there is no ransom or fine)?

Jul 122016
 

Three different explanations (in addition to the two taught yesterday) are brought to explain what the words in the verse regarding a shor tam “and the owner of the ox is clean (exempt)” come to exclude/teach.  Each is questioned as at first they each seem unnecessary but are then explained.

Jul 112016
 

Can a bull who was used in bullfight and killed someone be used as a sacrifice?  Rav and Shmuel argue about this.  If a shor tam who kills get stoned according to the Torah, how can you have a case of a shor muad who gets stoned?  The rabbis give several different scenarios of how this can be – however many of the answers are rejected.  The gemara then brings a braita that discusses whether or not it is forbidden to eat the animal who killed if one slaughtered it before it was stoned.  There are different derivations from the verse which leads to different conclusions.

Jul 102016
 

Study Guide Bava Kamma 40

An animal owned by one who is deaf, not mentally capable or a minor – they are not responsible for the animal.  However a guardian is appointed to be in charge.  Exactly what he pays and whose money he pays from and in which case (tam or muad) is debated.  A braita is quoted which says that a guardian is not responsible for paying the ransom fee that one pays if the ox kills a person.  a discussion ensues about what is the nature of the ransom payment and can it be derived from a tannaitic debate – is it repentance or compensation for the family of the deceased?  Some other questions are raised by Rabbi Acha bar Yaakov and he stumps Rav Nachman on them regarding the nature of the repentance of this ransom payment.  Can it be shared by joint owners and if so, how?  Can we assume one would take it as seriously as one who is obligated in a sin or guilt offering?  2 issues are raised about an animal who is borrowed – one where the borrower thinks he is a tam but he really was muad – the law is that they share the full payment (each pays half).  And a second case where he became a muad while he was borrowed but when he is returned to the original owner, he reverts back to being a tam.  The logic behind these halachot are explained in the gemara and the seeming contradiction between the two.

Jul 082016
 

If either the injured animal or the one that injures is hekdesh, there is no payment.  If the animal who is injured belongs to a Canaanite, there is no payment.  However if the reverse is true, the Caananite must pay.  The Meiri limits this halacha and explains that the Caananite reference in the mishna would not be applicable to non Jews in his day (and not in ours either).  The sources of these laws are derived from verses.  Does a non Jew get rewarded for learning Torah or keeping the seven Noahide laws?   What is appropriate and not appropriate to be said to someone mourning a loss?  A difference of opinion is brought.   A discussion of the merits of Amon and Moav is brought and what lesson can be learned from them.  How do we treat the Samaritans in terms of laws of damages – like non Jews or like Jews?